![]() What lessons can BitWarden take from the LastPass breach to improve their security? ![]() How is payment information and other user account information protected? That has the advantage that LP can give some degree of prompting while still locked to show you that it knows data about a given site, but not actually provide credentials. Lastpass stores some data unencrypted, for instance data about which sites you use, but not the username or password. if you have the database encrypted, you shouldn't be able to have any idea what is in it. Or they could impersonate Bitwarden staff and try to phish your Bitwarden master password.Īre all fields (including URLs, URIs, etc) in the vault encrypted? Of course, they wouldn't actually have any knowledge of what bank or other website was associated with the timestamp in question (because all such information is stored encrypted), but they may take a shotgun approach and get lucky, or they may combine the timestamp information with information about you that has been cross-referenced from other data leaks or that is publicly available. There has been some anomalous activity in your account, so we need you to verify your credentials by clicking on this link."). ![]() We noticed that your password was changed at 8:42pm on Dec. However if you do plan to change services to Bitwarden or some other service, it would be smart to change before you change any passwords individually.Īny information could be exploited by a threat actor in some way, but personally, I would not be concerned about the timestamp data being leaked.Īt worst, these data could be used for spearphishing, by providing some credible context for a personalized communication ( "This is so-and-so from First National Bank. The only real 100% protection you have against your stolen vault being brute forced is changing each password individually (changing services or changing your master password won't help here). Brute forcing happens offline with the copy of the vault they already stole, nothing you do now can do anything to prevent that copy from being brute forced (but if you used a reasonably strong password, you should be safe for somewhere between some number of years to some number of centuries. Moving to another service won't help you against the threat of Brute Force. E-mail and Phone number and Name (if you filled out those sections) was stolen from your lastpass account data, which is outside the vault.Īs to the Article you read. Vault data is the stuff you secure/save using Lastpass, and that is what is supposed to be E2E encrypted. The unencrypted E-mail and Phone Number are not vault data. Whether you work for a security company or are protecting a family account, it is also important to remember that often when we hear about hacking, it is someone gaining access through social engineering attacks, which means a lot of the basics ring true for all team members, ensure that workstations are locked down, 2FA is utilized, zero trust where possible, and to be suspicious of any communications that rely on time/pressure to get a response. The Bitwarden team continues to focus first and foremost on security, with the team undergoing regular security training, the open source codebase being under regular public scrutiny on Github, subjected to third party audits and consistently monitored by security researchers as part of the bug bounty program. You can also read more about our minimal data collection here: Īnd here is a link to some of the steps we take to protect the Bitwarden codebase. All your TOTP secrets will be printed into the console log, easy to then copy into Bitwarden for example.Hey thanks for checking in! Yes, the information that you input into a Bitwarden vault is encrypted.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |